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Abstract 
 
 
We investigate the training choices made by workers entering the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) 
program.  This is important as more workers enter these types of programs due to technological change 
and globalization.  We show that workers that choose a training occupation beyond their skill level (skill 
overshooting) or previous wage level (wage overshooting) achieve higher earnings and wage replacement 
rates with the cost being that it lowers their reemployment rates. Specifically, skill overshooting lowers 
the reemployment rates for these workers by 2.0 to 3.2 percentage points, but they enjoy an increase in 
their earnings by 2.0 - 2.2 percent. Wage overshooting leads to a similar decline in the reemployment rate 
(2.2 percentage points) but shows a much larger increase in their earnings (6.9 to 8.5%).  The findings are 
robust to various subsamples.  
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I. Introduction 
Recent labor market experiences during the Great Recession and thereafter has brought the issue 
of worker dislocation and reemployment into the center stage of policy discussions. The job loss rate 
during the Great Recession rose to 16% from more typical rates of 8-12% according to Farber (2011). The 
mean duration of unemployment soared to over 40 weeks in 2011 compared to an average of under 15 
weeks from the 1970 to 2000.1 Farber (2005) finds that when displaced workers become reemployed, 
their wages are 15% lower2 and Farber (2011) finds that this decrease rose to 16.5% during the Great 
Recession. In an effort to combat these negative effects, governments around the world offer various 
active labor market programs (ALMPs) to dislocated workers to help with reemployment (Barnow and 
Smith, 2016).3 
This paper evaluates one such program by focusing on the occupational training provision of the 
Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program. We investigate whether the training, when participants 
take it as a chance to upgrade their skills, can provide an extra boost to their post-participation earnings. 
The TAA program is a dislocated worker program administered by U.S. Department of Labor that is 
designed to help those whose employment is adversely affected by foreign competition.  We use the TAA 
participants’ data because of the information that it provides on the services each participant received as 
well as detailed information on the individual participants.  There is a particular emphasis on the 
classroom occupational training in the TAA based on the idea that import competing tasks are being 
replaced by foreign competition at an increasing rate (Acemoglu et al., 2016; Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 
2016), rendering the skill sets possessed by the TAA eligible workers practically obsolete in the U.S. To 
secure a sustainable career path, obtaining new sets of skills still marketable in the U.S. is deemed 
necessary.  
                                                             
1 Authors calculations using U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2019). 
2 The sample used in this paper shows a mean wage replacement rate of 87%. 
3 Barnow and Smith (2016) give a comprehensive description of the U.S. ALMPs and a survey of the program evaluation 
literature on those U.S. programs.  Card et al. (2010, 2015) provide a meta-analysis of ALMPs globally. 
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Schochet et al. (2012) show that TAA participants suffer from negative impacts on both 
employment and earnings in their large scale survey study of those who started receiving their UI benefits 
between September 2004 and October 2008. They find that the TAA trainees experience much smaller 
negative impacts (on both employment and earnings) compared to non-trainee participants. Our paper 
goes one step further into examining what type of training is most beneficial.4   
Our investigation focuses on the participants’ choice of training occupation with an intention of 
skill upgrading.  Specifically, we examine a choice of an occupation that is beyond their skill level 
(overshooting) compared to a choice of an occupation that is at their skill level or below. When a 
participant is eligible for TAA benefits, the decision on whether to receive training is done through 
counseling with the staff but the choice of the occupation of training is left to the worker (Mack, 2009).5 
For this reason, the choice of training occupation reflects the participant’s own intention rather than that 
of the counselor. We use their educational attainment as a proxy for skill level to define skill overshooting 
as a participant choosing to train for an occupation where the average job holder6 of that occupation has at 
least one more year of education compared to the participant.7 Skill upgrading is defined as the participant 
finding a job in an occupation with the average job holder of that occupation having at least one more 
year of education.8 To put it simply, skill overshooting concerns the training program (participant’s 
                                                             
4 Park (2012) is another study that looks closely at the occupational training provision of the TAA program. They show that only 
32% of the TAA trainees find a job in the occupation for which they receive training and those who found a job in their 
training occupation enjoy a small yet statistically significant advantage in post-exit earnings. However, the majority of TAA 
trainees manage to find a job even if the new job is not in their training occupation; they might be able to use the training 
opportunity to improve their post-participation job prospects.    
5 Mack (2009) describes the process of the training-or-no-training decision and which training program to enter in detail from 
interviews with caseworkers at 44 American Job Centers (AJCs) from 23 states (Appendix B, Mack 2009). Once the training 
decision is made, the participant goes through a rigorous assessment to determine which training program to enter. The report 
says that if a participant expresses interest in a particular training program, the assessment is conducted mostly to certify the 
feasibility of the choice based on funding availability, personal finances, duration of training, and whether the participant has 
the basic skills required for the particular training program. The staff’s input enters in the program choice when a participant 
does not know whether they want/need training or when the participant does not know which training program to enter.  
6 IPUMS CPS Data 
7 We also run the estimations using a two-years-or-more threshold as an alternative definition of skill overshooting. The results 
are very similar. 
8 Admittedly, a participant’s skill level would be better measured as a combination of their education and the accumulated skill 
sets at previous employments. Using education alone may not adequately capture their capacity to perform a certain level of 
tasks. However, this is less of a concern in this study because TAA participants are more likely to switch occupations as the 
tasks they performed at their previous employments are disappearing from the U.S. The accumulated job-related skill sets are 
less relevant in their reemployment in this case compared to participants in other labor market programs.  
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intention) and skill upgrading concerns the post-participation reemployment (participant’s outcome). We 
also consider an alternative definition of overshooting and upgrading based on occupations which on 
average pay at least 25% better than the participant’s previous job. 
We construct the control group – TAA trainees that did not overshoot – using the nearest 
neighbor propensity score matching without replacement to minimize the selection bias that is inherent in 
any voluntary program participation. Andersson et al. (2013) documents that the selection into training 
enrollment within a program is less of an issue compared to the selection into participating in the program 
itself. We expect that the selection issue in our analysis is even smaller as we compare skill overshooters 
to non overshooters among TAA trainees.  Carefully selecting a control group through propensity score 
matching reduces the selection issue further. 
We find that overshooters succeed in finding better wages with a small cost to their employment 
rate. Specifically, workers who overshoot in terms of skill level in their training occupation choice 
increase their wage replacement rate by 1.8 – 2.9 percentage points (pps) and their earnings by 1.8 – 
2.9%. But skill overshooting reduces the chance of reemployment by 2.0 – 2.3 pps. Wage overshooting 
increases the wage replacement by 5.3 – 9.3 pps and earnings level by 5.6 – 8.5%. The impact of wage 
overshooting on reemployment rate is nearly identical to that of skill overshooting at a reduction of 2.2 
pps. The results are robust across different subsamples where we consider high school graduates to isolate 
the variance in education.  We also consider workers within a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) region 
that allows us to control for the MSA’s unemployment rate in an attempt to control for demand beyond 
our state and year fixed effects.  
The main contribution of this study is that we look more deeply at the process of workers after a 
layoff. As we note throughout this paper, for the past couple decades, there has been studies that look at 
the labor market impacts of globalization and recent studies examine the impacts of occupation- and 
industry-switching of the trade displaced workers.  With the help of rich information on TAA services 
rendered to each participant, our study looks at the workers’ decisions and how the decision making 
process influences their labor market outcomes.   
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Liu and Trefler (2019) is the closest to our study in the sense that they focus on the behavioral 
aspect of occupation switching among the workers whose displacement is connected to rising import 
competition. They examine the impact of trade in services with China and India on U.S. labor market 
outcomes by studying how this impacted unemployment and earnings for the period of 1996-2007. They 
distinguish workers who switch to an occupation that pays more on average than their current occupation 
(upward switching) and those who switch to an occupation that pays less on average than the current 
occupation (downward switching). They find that rising service imports from China and India over the 
past decade have increased the incidence of downward switching by 17%, while upward switching has 
only increased by 4% over the past decade.9  They find that workers leaving import-competing 
occupations face higher chances of downward switching. This could be a result of labor supply and 
demand shifts, but it could be driven by the conscious choices of the workers themselves. Our data on 
training occupations can address these choices.10  Kosteas and Park (2015) is another study that explores 
the occupation switching behavior of trade-displaced workers. They trace workers transitioning away 
from import-competing occupations and find that the cross-occupation movement of trade-displaced 
workers has a significant negative impact on the wages of the incumbent workers in the receiving 
occupations as well as the trade-displaced workers entering these occupations.  
This paper also complements previous research on the positive transitions from industrial 
switching behavior of the trade-displaced.  Autor et al. (2014) show a positive impact of industry-
switching among the trade-displaced workers in their investigation of the impacts of rising industry-level 
exposure to Chinese imports between 1990 and 2007. They find a large and negative impact on the 
cumulative earnings in general but show that the workers who switch industries, though still within the 
                                                             
9 In section V, our alterative strategy for studying overshooting and undershooting will be directly related to their paper. There, 
we will discuss their paper further.   
10  Of course, the “workers’ choices” could reflect that of the participant and a counselor. 
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manufacturing sector, experience a positive impact on their earnings. Hyman (2018) also finds positive 
impacts of industry-switching on earnings.11   
Our findings can be extended to other federal dislocated worker programs that offer job training 
services with caution. TAA program benefits are delivered at American Job Centers (AJCs) under the 
Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA)12, an umbrella program that delivers employment-
related services covered by many federal programs such as Employment Services (Wagner-Peyser Act), 
Job Corps, and Welfare-to-Work. When a worker is eligible for job training under any of these programs 
including the TAA program, the decision making process follows the WIOA system13.  Career counseling 
and assistance with training enrollment are done with WIOA staff rather than with a staff member who is 
specifically designated to TAA participants.14  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data sources, section III 
shows the variable definitions and summary statistics on skill overshooting, section IV presents our 
findings. Section V shows the data and estimation results for wage overshooting. Section VI concludes.  
 
II. Data 
a. Trade Act Participant Report (TAPR) and TAA Petition Data 
The Employment and Training Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor manages two 
separate datasets regarding the Trade Adjustment Assistance program: one for the petitions and the other 
for the participants. The Trade Act participant Report (TAPR) collects information on TAA participants 
including individual characteristics (gender, age, ethnicity, and education), pre-participation employment 
information (industry, tenure, and earnings), benefits received during participation (training enrollment, 
                                                             
11 Hyman (2018)’s sample covers the workers eligible for the TAA benefits (employed at an establishment in Longitudinal 
Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) data matched to a certified TAA petition) rather than those that receive occupational 
training.    
12 Our sample covers people who entered the program between 1999 and 2007, so the TAA benefits were delivered through the 
Workforce Investment Act (WIA) system which was replaced by WIOA in July 2015. 
13 The decisions involve core services, intensive services, then training. 
14 Many TAA participants are co-enrolled in WIOA. The main administrative differences would be that TAA funds are more 
readily available for training program as the program has a much higher emphasis on job training by design.  
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occupations of training, training duration, and income support received), and post-participation 
information (reemployment, occupation of reemployment, and earnings).  The data was acquired through 
a Freedom of Information Act request. Our sample covers workers who participated in the TAA program 
from 1998 to 2007 with the year of program exit ranging from 1999 to 2008.15 We limit the sample to 
manufacturing since the TAA program was initially restricted to cover manufacturing establishments that 
were directly hit by import competition.16  
For the analysis controlling for the local labor market, we need information on the participant’s 
geographic location beyond the state of residency reported in TAPR.  We link the TAA petition data to 
TAPR using the petition numbers and use the location of the previous employer (MSA) as a proxy for the 
participant’s location. 
 
b. Current Population Survey (CPS) 
IPUMS CPS together with TAPR data is used to construct our main variables, skill overshooting 
and skill upgrading. We construct skill overshooting and upgrading by comparing a participant’s skill 
level to the average skill level for those in the occupations for which the participant is trained and the job 
for which the participant is employed. We use educational attainment as a proxy for skill level and the 
skill level of an occupation is measured as the average years of schooling for job holders of the 
occupation taken from the CPS file.  
 
c. Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) 
OES reports hourly wages and annual earnings for each occupation based on the Standard 
Occupation Code (SOC) system. We use the occupation-level earnings in constructing the wage 
overshooting variable by comparing a participant’s wages at the previous employment to the median 
                                                             
15 See Table A1 in the appendix for the distribution of the educational attainment of participants across years. 
16 The TAA program was revised in 2002 with an expanded eligibility to include non-production establishments.  The expansion 
also included upstream and downstream establishments from the directly affected establishments without any restriction on 
industry. 19% of the TAA participants recorded in TAPR are from non-manufacturing sectors  
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earnings of his/her training occupation. The dataset is managed by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS).  
 
d. Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) 
LAUS provides labor market statistics at various levels of geographic disaggregation from state-
level to city-level. This data is managed by BLS and is constructed from merging various sources of labor 
market data. We use MSA-level unemployment rates to control for the participant’s local labor market.  
We offer the analysis with MSA-level unemployment rate as a robustness check as only 24% of TAA 
participants reside in a MSA and therefore, using local labor market information drastically reduces the 
sample size.   
 
e. Trade Data 
We use the updated version (v2011.3.3) of Bernard, Jensen, Schott (2006) which is publicly 
available on NBER. This revision extends the original data up to the period of 1972 – 2007 based on 4-
digit 1987 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. We use the data from 1998 to 2007.  This 
dataset contains raw trade data, import shares, and the import penetration rate for all trade partners and 
low-income partners. Low-income countries are defined to have their GDP per capita that is less than 5% 
of the U.S. level throughout the period between 1972 and 2005. We take the total imports from all trade 
partners and low-income trade partners together with the total exports of the United States and the 
industry-level total value of shipments in the U.S. to construct our import penetration rates.17 
 
 
III. Definitions and Summary Statistics  
a. Definitions: Skill Overshooting and Skill Upgrading 
                                                             
17 We also construct the import penetration variable from China alone for use in estimations. All estimates are nearly identical to 
those in specifications with the low-income country import penetration and are therefore not reported in this paper.  
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 Skill overshooting is a choice variable that captures a participant’s intention as she chooses the 
occupation for which to be trained. It compares the skill level of the training occupation to that of the 
participant’s skill level. Higher skill overshooting signals that the participant wants to improve her job 
prospects by increasing her skill level. On the other hand, skill upgrading is an outcome variable that is 
linked to reemployment. Skill upgrading compares the skill level of the reemployment occupation to the 
participant’s skill level.  
 In this study, we use educational attainment measured in years of schooling as a proxy for skill 
levels.18  Accordingly, skill overshooting (Skill_OSi) and skill upgrading (Skill_UPi) are defined as the 
following:  
 
Skill_OSi  = Average schooling of participant i’s training occupation –  i’s schooling    (1) 
Skill_UPi  = Average schooling of participant i’s reemployment occupation – i’s schooling    (2) 
 
The information on participants’ schooling is obtained from the TAPR. The average schooling of 
occupations of training and reemployment are measured as the average years of schooling of job holders 
for the occupation in the CPS.19 
 Using skill overshooting and skill upgrading defined above, we also construct indicator variables, 
I_SkillOSi and I_ SkillUPi, for overshooting and upgrading, respectively. We consider a two-year (±1 
year) band around the participant’s education to represent her skill-level.  If a participant chooses a 
training occupation with the average schooling above the band, we say she is overshooting and assign the 
value of one to I_SkillOS. The indicator variable for skill upgrading is constructed in the same way.  
 
𝐼_𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑂𝑆𝑖 = 1     if  𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙_𝑂𝑆𝑖 > 1;     0  otherwise    (3) 
                                                             
18 The best measure of a worker’s skill level would be a combination of schooling and previous work experiences. However, 
proper measurement of this is not a straightforward matter. Another proxy to consider is the skill level of pre-participation 
employment measured as the average level of education of the workers in that occupation. Unfortunately, pre-participation 
occupation is not reported in the TAPR. There are other worker-level data sets such as PSID, NLSY, or IPUMS CPS March 
Supplement that report previous and current occupations, but they lack the detailed information on job-training programs 
between the jobs.  
19 We use IPUMS CPS data to construct occupational education levels rather than TAPR because CPS is more representative of 
the general workforce while TAA participants tend to be skewed toward less-educated, low-skilled workers. 
10 
 
𝐼_𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑃𝑖 = 1     if  𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙_𝑈𝑃𝑖 > 1;     0  otherwise    (4) 
 
 Table 1 summarizes the skill overshooting and the skill upgrading variables. A near majority of 
the sample chose a training occupation that is comparable to their own skill level (±1 year; 49.24%).  This 
is also the case for the occupation of reemployment (57.49%).  Table 1 also shows that overshooting is 
common among the TAA participants. 38.94% of the sample overshoots in their training choices. 
However, upgrading is less common and occurs in 25.56% of the sample. We still observe participants 
who undershoot (11.82%) and downgrade (16.96%); however, these participants account for a small 
fraction of the TAA participants. Overall, participants train for jobs that have 0.74 more years of 
education than the participant had upon entering the program and these participants end in jobs that have 
0.25 more years of education than the participant originally had.   
Table 2 summarizes the pattern of overshooting and upgrading for people with different levels of 
educational background. The obvious trend is that participants with lower educational attainment tend to 
overshoot more and achieve upgrading more frequently. It is intuitive that people with a lower skill level 
benefit more from skill upgrading and therefore they show a higher rate of overshooting. However, a part 
of what we observe in Table 2 is also due to the way the variables are defined. The skill levels of 
occupations of training and reemployment are measured by the average years of schooling of people who 
are employed in that occupation as reported in the CPS while participants’ skill level is his/her own 
educational attainment. Naturally, participants’ own skill level conveys much larger variation.  The mean 
values of the average education for occupations from the CPS are around 13.3 years with the minimum 
values around 10.5 years of schooling. TAA participants’ education levels vary from 8 years to 17 years.20 
This makes anyone below 9.5 years of schooling an overshooter. The same goes for highly educated 
participants. If you are highly educated, you will likely be sitting at the higher end of that spectrum, 
making you an undershooter. For this reason, the coefficient on education regarding the estimates on who 
overshoots and who upgrades should be interpreted with caution.   
                                                             
20 See Table A1 in the Appendix for a detailed breakdown of these summary statistics. 
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IV. Results 
The main question of this study is whether aiming for a higher skill-level occupation (skill overshooting) 
through a federal job training program improves the labor market outcomes of the trainees. Before a more 
detailed analysis, we first want to confirm whether skill overshooting leads to skill upgrading once we 
control for individual characteristics of TAA participants using simple OLS estimations as the following:  
 
Outcomei = α+β I_SkillOSi + γXi + εi  
 
Outcomei will take different values including an indicator for skill upgrading (I_SkillUPi) and various 
labor market outcomes such as whether the worker is reemployed, the wage replacement rate for the 
reemployed worker, and the earnings for the worker after exiting the program.  I_SkillOSi is an indicator 
for skill overshooting defined above.  Xi is a vector of control variables such as education, age, gender, 
ethnicity, MSA residency, and the year of program exit. We also use 2-digit SIC industry and state fixed 
effects.  
 Table 3 presents the results. Skill overshooting shows a strong connection to skill upgrading. 
Participants who overshoot show a higher likelihood of upgrading by 41.3 pps.  However, there is a cost 
to overshooting as these workers have a decreased reemployment rate (2.8 pps).  Earnings show 
improvement with a higher wage replacement (1.8 pps) and higher post-participation earnings (2.2%). 
 
a. Propensity Score Matching Estimation 
A question that naturally arises here is whether the previous findings are driven by selection. Do 
the high ability trainees who are pre-disposed to upgrading select into overshooting?  In an attempt to 
separate the impact of selection from the impact of overshooting itself, we construct the control group for 
the treated (skill-overshooters) using a propensity score via the nearest neighbor matching without 
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replacement. This methodology reduces the selection issues around the overshooting behavior by 
allowing us to choose the control group that are similar to the treatment group in their pre-participation 
characteristics.21 We use age, gender, educational attainment, tenure at previous employment, English 
proficiency, pre-participation earnings, and ethnicity along with participation year fixed effects and 2-
digit SIC industry fixed effects to estimate the likelihood of overshooting. 
Table 4 provides the results of the propensity score estimation.  The impact of higher educational 
attainment is negative with large magnitudes and strong precision. Each additional year of education is 
associated with a decline in the likelihood of overshooting by approximately 22 pps. This finding is 
consistent across specifications although this is partly to be driven by the definitions of the overshooting 
and the upgrading variables as discussed earlier.22 Limited English proficiency also tends to discourage 
participants from overshooting with the decrease in likelihood of approximately 5 pps.  Older workers and 
those with a longer tenure at the previous job are also related to less overshooting which fits the narrative 
that more senior workers are less likely to dramatically change their occupation.  Pre-participation 
earnings have positive impacts on the likelihood of overshooting where a one log point increase in pre-
participation earnings leads to an increase in the likelihood of overshooting by approximately 4 pps. Since 
the wage rate is a good signal for the worker’s skill level, a higher pre-participation earnings linked to a 
higher rate of skill overshooting is not surprising. In general, white females are more likely to overshoot; 
this is clear from the estimates on our dummy variables regarding ethnicity along with the estimates on 
our male dummy variable.  
We also include industry-level import competition as a factor that affects the choices of training 
occupation.  Import competition is measured by the import penetration23 for the 3-digit SIC industry of 
                                                             
21 As discussed earlier, selection into training or not given participation in a certain program poses a smaller bias than selection 
into the participation of the program itself (Andersson et al., 2013). Our selection issue is likely to be smaller as our analysis 
concerns occupation choices given everyone in our sample is receiving job training from the TAA program.  
22 We are not concerned with this issue since the interpretation of these coefficients are not of particular significance.  Rather, the 
estimation is attempting to capture the behavioral patterns common to people with certain individual characteristics that will 
allow us to match similar workers. However, the results still provide us with a better understanding of who overshoots.   
23 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑥𝑡 =
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑉𝑆𝑖𝑡 −𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 
     where i = 3-digit SIC industry, t = participation year, x ∈ {all imports, low-income imports} 
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their pre-participation employment.  We look at two sources of import competition: one from general 
imports and one from imports from low-income countries. Low income countries are the countries whose 
per-capita GDP is 5% or less of that of the U.S. throughout the sample period following Bernard, Jensen 
and Schott (2006). This includes China. A higher awareness on the negative impact of foreign 
competition on employment could have opposing impacts on their overshooting behaviors. A worker 
might try harder to upgrade their skill sets, so they have better job security in the long-run (more likely to 
overshoot); or, a worker might become even more insecure about the chances of reemployment, so they 
choose an occupation with lower skill-level and/or lower pay (less likely to overshoot).  
Import penetration from low-wage countries have large, positive, and significant impacts on the 
chance of overshooting while general imports show small and insignificant coefficients. Specifically, 
participants displaced from sectors with high import competition from low-income countries increase 
their likelihood of overshooting with their occupational training by 9.9% to 11.1%.  These import 
measures seem to be capturing certain behavioral patterns that are not directly related to the level of 
education since adding import competition from low-income countries leave the results on education to be 
essentially the same.24     
Given the large and significant impacts of pre-participation earnings and of import competition 
from low-income countries, we choose specification six to construct the control group participants. For 
each treated observation, one or two participants are chosen as a control group within the same state of 
residency. Table 5 shows summary statistics for the treated and the control groups. All five variables 
display very similar values for these two sample groups. This indicates that the results of the following 
estimations on labor market outcomes are not likely driven by these observable characteristics of 
participants.  
 
                                                             
24 The coefficients of specifications V and VI are essentially the same if we use import penetration from Chinese imports only 
rather than all imports from low-wage countries. Chinese imports account for the majority of low-wage country imports 
throughout the sample period.  
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b. Benchmark estimation – Skill overshooting on labor market outcomes 
Table 6 shows the impacts of skill overshooting on various labor market outcomes. These 
findings show that the overshooters enjoy more earnings although the strategy has some risks since it 
reduces the chance of finding a job after training, consistent with the OLS estimation shown in Table 3.  
The first column shows that the link between overshooting and upgrading is large and strong. Skill 
overshooting in training leads to a higher likelihood of skill upgrading in employment by 40.2 pps.  
Recall that this coefficient was 0.413 in the OLS estimation from Table 3. This suggests the selection 
issue is not the driving link between overshooting and upgrading. The second column of Table 6 indicates 
that overshooting reduces the chance of reemployment by 2 pps indicating that overshooting is not 
costless; overshooters are taking a risk of not being able to find a job after completing the training. The 
rest of Table 6 shows the earnings effects.  Overshooting raises the wage replacement rate by 1.7 pps and 
post participation earnings by 2.2% after accounting for prior earnings.   
The same overall results hold in the MSA subsample which is found in Table 6 Section B.  This is 
one of the two subsamples that we consider for robustness.  The advantage of this group is that we can 
control for local labor market conditions beyond the state and year fixed effects. Barnette and Park (2017) 
show the importance of geographic location in determining the labor market outcomes of a TAA 
participant in two ways . First, the local labor market situation affects the service delivery at the local 
AJCs as their workload changes.  Second, the local labor market situation could affect the participants’ 
training decisions. Both influence whether a participant receives occupational training and which training 
she receives; these are the main decisions we explore in this study. More broadly, the adverse impacts of 
trade-induced displacements have been shown to spread to other workers that share the same local labor 
market (Kondo, 2018; Park et al., 2014; Autor et al., 2013). 
We employ the information on the local labor market situation by using dummies on the MSA 
unemployment rate upon exiting the program grouped into the following intervals: 6-9%, 9-12%, and 
12% or higher.  The disadvantage of this subsample is the decrease in observations.  Again, we see that 
overshooting increases the chance of upgrading by 50.5 pps.  There is still a cost of overshooting for this 
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subsample with reemployment rates being 3.2 pps lower.  The results on the wage replacement rates and 
earnings are very similar to what we found for the entire sample in magnitudes but are less statistically 
significant. This could be due to the smaller sample size. 
 
c. Analysis of the High School Educated Subsample 
To minimize the variations in participants’ skill level further, we continue the analysis by holding 
constant the education level of the participants.  Specifically, we consider participants who are high 
school graduates or have the equivalent level of education. They have one of the following: a high school 
diploma, 12 years of schooling without a diploma, or a GED.  We provide the results of the propensity 
score estimation for this subsample in Table 7.  The first three columns show the results regardless of 
participants’ geographic location and the next three columns show the results for those who reside in a 
MSA. With years of schooling no longer a factor for the estimation, limited English proficiency becomes 
more important. In the propensity score estimation for the total sample (Table 4), limited English 
proficiency reduced the chance of overshooting by about 5 pps. Here, the negative impact is 8.2 pps.  The 
impact of prior earnings for this sub-sample is still positive at 2.9 pps after restricting the sample to the 
same level of education.  The link between higher skilled workers (signaled by higher pre-participation 
earnings) and higher rate of overshooting is consistent with what we find for the whole sample (Table 4) 
but with a smaller magnitude. The results are similar for those within MSAs.   
Table 8 shows the estimation on labor market outcomes for this subsample. The estimates are 
very similar to those of Table 6, the outcome estimation with participants with all levels of educational 
attainment, although Table 8 demonstrates a bigger positive impact on the earnings outcomes. Again, 
overshooting comes with a trade-off, it reduces the chance of reemployment by 2.9 pps but it improves 
earning outcomes – 2.2 pps increase in the wage replacement rate and 2.9% increase in the earnings.  The 
MSA subsample for this education group also reveals the same pattern as shown in panel B of Table 8 
where skill overshooting lowers the chance of reemployment but improves earning outcomes. The 
estimates are similar in magnitude as well.  
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V. Alternative Strategy: Wage Overshooting and Wage Upgrading 
Another way to approach the question of how participants can take advantage of federal job 
training provisions, is to examine whether they choose to train for occupations that offer wages that are 
substantially higher than that of their previous employment. In this, participants engage in wage 
overshooting rather than skill overshooting. While skill overshooting has a direct implication to the skill 
acquisition aspect of job training, wage overshooting is more straightforward as occupational wage 
information is more readily available to participants at the time of decision making.  
For the analysis, we build wage overshooting and wage upgrading variables in the similar manner 
to the way we build the skill overshooting and skill upgrading variables.  Wage overshooting (Wage_OSi) 
captures the intention of the participant.  It measures the difference between the participant’s own earning 
prior to participation to the average earnings of the training occupation of her choice. Wage upgrading 
(Wage_UPi) captures the outcome of training using the post-participation earnings of the participant 
herself compared to her pre-participation earnings.  
 
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑂𝑆𝑖 = 
average earnings of the training occupation in the year of participation
participant's pre-participation earning
    (5) 
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑈𝑃𝑖= 
participant's post-participation earnings
participant's pre-participation earning
       (6) 
 
The average earnings of the training occupation is taken from OES data. Notice that wage upgrading uses 
the participant’s own post-participation earnings rather than the average earnings of the reemployment 
occupation. We again construct indicator variables for wage overshooting (I_WageOS) and upgrading 
(I_WageUP) with a threshold of a 25% increase.25 Specifically, we have the following:   
 
𝐼_𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑂𝑆𝑖 =  1,  if  𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑂𝑆𝑖 > 1.25;        0,  otherwise    (7) 
                                                             
25 We run the same wage overshooting estimations with an alternative threshold of a 50% increase. The same general results hold 
but it severely limits our sample size for the outcome estimations as there are fewer observations in the treated group. 
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𝐼_𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑈𝑃𝑖 = 1,   if  𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑈𝑃𝑖 > 1.25;        0,  otherwise      (8) 
 
This alternative strategy is related to Liu and Trefler (2019) where the worker sorting behavior is 
categorized as upward or downward switching using occupation-level average earnings for both pre- and 
post-layoff earnings rather than the worker’s own earnings as in this study. Ranking occupations based on 
the average earnings provides a good sense of ‘which job is better’ at least in the earnings sense and 
moving to a job with higher average earning indicates a general upward mobility of the worker. Our study 
differs from theirs as we focus on participants’ conscious choices on whether to upgrade skill-levels or 
earnings as a strategic move and the impacts of such choices.  As a participant chooses a training 
occupation, their decision would be based on a comparison between their own background (e.g. their own 
earnings) and information about available options (employment projection and average earnings of 
various occupations). If she was a high earner for the occupation she was holding previously, she would 
like to choose an occupation that would on average offer a wage that is higher than what she was making, 
not what an average worker of her previous occupation was making.  As this study focuses on 
participants’ intention to improve (indicated by their overshooting behavior), using the participant’s own 
pre-participation earning as a benchmark is more appropriate.26    
Table 9 provides the summary statistics from overshooting/upgrading on wages.  This definition 
of wage overshooting splits the sample more equally amongst those that overshoot versus those that do 
not.  Specifically, we see that 32.83% of the sample overshoots for wages while 28.13% undershoot.  
Again, a much smaller percentage achieve wage upgrading (14.98%) while a much larger share (45.94%) 
downgrades. Table 10 shows that the average size of wage overshooting decreases with the educational 
attainment of participants, but the decline is very small especially given a large variation of wage 
overshooting within each education group.  We see that, on average, workers train for occupations that 
                                                             
26 Measuring upward switching based on average earnings of two occupations would be more relevant if one preserves his/her 
own percentile in earning spectrum of an occupation as he/she switches but this is unlikely. In other words, the measure in Liu 
and Trefler (2019) captures the ranking of occupational earnings in general while our measure is specific to the individual. 
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would pay them 16% more than their earlier earnings but they end with employment that pays 87% of 
their previous earnings. 
 
a. Propensity Score Estimation 
Table 11 shows the propensity score estimation of wage overshooting. The specifications shown 
here are the same as specifications II and VI for skill-overshooting propensity score estimation shown in 
Table 4. Comparing the estimates of Table 11 to Table 4 indicates that wage overshooters are 
characteristically different from skill overshooters. First, participants with higher educational attainment 
are more likely to overshoot on wages where higher education shows very negative impact on the chance 
of skill overshooting. Second, high pre-participation earnings have a strongly negative impact.  This is the 
opposite of the finding with skill overshooting although this could be due to our definition of wage 
overshooting.27  Additionally, male participants show a higher chance of wage overshooting by 14.7 pps 
while they are much less likely to skill-overshoot (by 14.5 pps). Being displaced from industries with 
high import competition from low income countries does not seem to have much of an impact on the 
likelihood of wage overshooting of the participant.  
Yet there are characteristics that affect the chance of both skill and wage overshooting in the 
same direction. Participants with limited English proficiency are less likely to overshoot on both skill-
level and wage implying that they are more risk averse in their reemployment efforts. White participants 
are more likely to overshoot in both skill and wage.  
The second set of columns show the same estimations for the restricted sample of high school 
graduates and those with equivalent education. The coefficients are very similar to the estimates for the 
complete sample. One noticeable thing is that limited English proficiency has larger negative impact on 
                                                             
27 As the dependent variable is constructed using the participant’s earnings record, the coefficients on pre-participation earnings 
should be interpreted with caution. The negative sign is possibly driven by the fact that participants with high pre-participation 
earnings are less likely to be identified as an overshooter as the average earnings of her training occupation is less likely to be 
substantially (25%) higher than her pre-participation earnings. This logic is similar to why we find strongly negative 
coefficients on years of schooling when we consider skill overshooting behavior in Table 4. Again, as in Table 4, we are not 
particularly concerned with this issue as we use propensity score estimation to link between individual characteristics and the 
tendency to overshoot in wages. 
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the chance of wage overshooting for high school graduates. This pattern is consistent with the previous 
findings for skill overshooting (Table 7).  Additionally, the findings on tenure and age are nearly the same 
between the various samples and these results are also nearly the same as our earlier analysis of skill 
overshooting. The estimations with only MSA residents do not show a large difference in coefficient 
estimates for both the high school graduates and the complete sample including all the education levels.  
 
b. Labor Market Outcomes  
The effects of wage overshooting on labor market outcomes are displayed in Table 12.  These 
findings are similar to the findings from the skill overshooting analysis shown earlier (Tables 6).  Wage 
overshooting increases the probability of wage upgrading by 6.3 pps.  As is the case with skill 
overshooting, there is a cost in wage overshooting in that it reduces the chance of finding reemployment 
by 2.2 pps (2.3 pps for MSA residents). 
The wage replacement rate shows a substantial increase of 6.4 pps after accounting for earnings 
prior to entering the TAA program.  Overall earnings are also positively affected by overshooting 
behavior showing an increase of 6.9% when pre-participation earnings are controlled.28  The magnitudes 
of the impact of wage overshooting on earning-related outcomes become even larger in the MSA 
subsample (7.8 pps increase in the wage replacement rate and 8.5% increase in the level of earnings). 
Given that the average wage replacement rate is about 87% for TAA program participants, these impacts 
are substantial. Compared to the analysis of skill overshooting, the magnitudes on the return to wage-
related outcomes are much stronger with wage overshooting.  
                                                             
28 The coefficients on the wage replacement rate and earnings differ based on whether pre-participation earning is controlled 
because pre-participation earnings is an important factor determining both the wage replacement rate and post-participation 
earnings.  First, participants with high pre-participation earnings are not likely to be identified as a wage-overshooter and they 
are also likely to have a low wage replacement rate. This creates an upward bias on the impact of wage overshooting on the 
wage replacement rate. Controlling for pre-participation earnings reduces the coefficient estimate on overshooting as we see in 
Table 12. Second, participants with high pre-participation earnings are likely to have higher post-participation earnings in 
general while they are less likely to be identified as an overshooter.  This generates a downward bias on the impact of 
overshooting on earnings, so controlling for pre-participation earnings increases the coefficient estimate of wage overshooting, 
again, as can be seen in Table 12.  
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Table 13 shows the estimation results for the subsample of high school graduates and those with 
equivalent education. The findings in this table confirm the findings for the sample with all education 
levels shown in Table 12.   The trainees who overshoot for wages succeed in wage upgrading with a 6.7 
pps higher probability, but wage overshooting decreases the chance of reemployment by 3.3pps.  Wage 
replacement rates for wage overshooters are 5.3 pps higher and their earnings are 6.0% higher. The results 
for MSA residents are very similar to the sample with no geographical restriction.  
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the role of a federal active labor market program in forming the 
outcomes of the participants with the focus on the job training provision of the Trade Adjustment 
Assistance (TAA) program. Specifically, we look at the participant’s choice of training occupation as a 
strategy to improve their earnings potential by aiming at occupations of higher skill levels (skill 
overshooting) or higher earnings levels (wage overshooting) compared to their own. 
While the average worker entering the TAA program loses 13% of their wages, which is in line 
with findings for displaced workers in the literature, the participants who overshoot both for higher skill 
level and for higher earnings experience improved earnings outcomes after exiting the program although 
such improved earning outcomes come at a cost of a reduced chance of reemployment. We find that skill 
overshooting increases the wage replacement rate by 1.7 – 2.0 pps and the level of earnings by 2.0 – 
2.2%.  Workers who overshoot for wages increase their wage replacement rates by 6.4 – 7.8 pps while 
increasing their overall earnings by 6.9 – 8.5%.  There is a cost to this behavior since these workers have 
their employment rate reduced by 2.0 – 3.2 pps depending on which type of overshooting is attempted. 
These findings are robust to various subsamples.   
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Table 1. Summary Statistics: Skill Overshooting and Upgrading 
                 a. TOTAL SAMPLE                 b. BALANCED SAMPLE(iii) 
 Overshoot(i) Upgrade(ii) Overshoot Upgrade 
 Observations 80,749 48,704 30,812 30,812 
Sample Share I (%)     
Less than -4 0.46 0.93 0.58 0.83 
Between -4 and -3 1.25 1.91 1.52 1.89 
Between -3 and -2 2.89 4.42 3.38 4.49 
Between -2 and -1 7.22 9.68 8.17 9.83 
Between -1 and 0 18.19 26.79 19.60 25.73 
Between 0 and 1 31.05 30.71 31.34 31.01 
Between 1 and 2 18.67 13.09 17.37 13.59 
Between 2 and 3 10.62 6.22 9.67 6.11 
Between 3 and 4 6.57 4.49 5.99 4.72 
More than 4 3.08 1.76 2.39 1.80 
Sample Share II (%)     
Overshooting / upgrading 38.94 25.56 35.42 26.22 
Appropriate 49.24 57.49 50.93 56.73 
Undershooting / Downgrading 11.82 16.96 13.64 17.06 
Other Stats     
Mean 0.74 0.25 0.60 0.27 
Std. Dev 1.64 1.59 1.63 1.59 
Min -5.74 -5.56 -5.40 -5.56 
Max 9.55 8.75 9.55 8.55 
i. The overshoot column for the total sample includes participants who enrolled in training programs with a valid occupation code for 
the training occupation reported in TAPR regardless of their reemployment status. 
ii. The upgrade column for the total sample includes participants who are reemployed with a valid occupation code for the 
reemployment occupation reported in TAPR regardless of their training status. 
iii. This is a unified sample of those who enrolled in training with a valid training occupation code then were reemployed with a valid 
reemployment occupation code.   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Educational Attainment and Skill Overshooting/Upgrading 
 Skill Overshooting Skill Upgrading 
 All observations(i) Balanced Sample(ii) All observations(iii) Balanced Sample 
Degree attainment 
No. of 
Obs. 
Avg. 
Overshoot 
(std dev) 
No. of 
Obs. 
Avg. 
Overshoot  
(std dev) 
  
No. of 
Obs. 
Avg. 
Upgrading 
(std dev) 
No. of 
Obs. 
Avg. 
Upgrading 
(std dev) 
Less than HS 7,827 3.01 (1.54) 2,475 2.82 (1.57) 4,796 2.43 (1.44) 2,475 2.55 (1.51) 
HS grad or eqv 47,433 1.05 (1.09) 17,185 1.03 (1.11) 27,204 0.60 (1.01) 17,185 0.68 (1.04) 
Some College 20,988 -0.21 (1.29) 9,060 -0.22 (1.28) 13,226 -0.61 (1.27) 9,060 -0.56 (1.28) 
Bachelor 3,807 -1.92 (1.30) 1,788 -1.90 (1.33) 2,926 -2.11 (1.41) 1,788 -2.09 (1.41) 
Grad School 694 -2.78 (1.34) 304 -2.78 (1.34) 552 -2.85 (1.42) 304 -2.91 (1.40) 
ALL 80,749 0.74 (1.64) 30,812 0.60 (1.63) 48,704 0.25 (1.59) 30,812 0.27 (1.59) 
i. Participants who enrolled in training programs with a valid training occupation code reported in TAPR regardless of their reemployment status. 
ii. Participants who enrolled in training with a valid training occupation code then were reemployed with a valid reemployment occupation code.   
iii. Participants who were reemployed with a valid reemployment occupation code reported in TAPR regardless of their training status. 
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 Table 3. Labor Market Outcomes of Skill Overshooting – Benchmark (OLS) Estimation 
 
 
Chance of Upgrading Reemployment  
Wage Replacement 
Rate 
Post-participation 
Earning 
I_SkillOS  0.413***  -0.028***   0.018***  0.022*** 
  (0.007)  (0.003)   (0.004)  (0.005) 
Ed: Years of Schooling -0.150*** -0.089*** 0.006*** 0.002  0.026*** 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Limited English proficiency -0.052*** -0.028 -0.027*** -0.028***  -0.016 -0.015 -0.032** -0.031**  
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) 
Tenure 0.001* 0.001*** 0.000 0.000  -0.001** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Pre-Part Earning)      -0.473*** -0.474*** 0.304*** 0.303*** 
      (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Age at participation -0.001*** 0.000 -0.006*** -0.006***  -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gender: Male -0.099*** -0.057*** 0.006* 0.003  0.130*** 0.133*** 0.178*** 0.181*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Eth: Black -0.046*** -0.048*** 0.011** 0.010**   -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.049*** -0.048*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Eth: Hispanic -0.014 -0.014 -0.013* -0.014*    -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.087*** -0.086*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Eth: Asian -0.049*** -0.033*   -0.034*** -0.036***  -0.001 -0.001 -0.016 -0.017 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
Eth: others -0.024 -0.010 -0.017 -0.018  -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013)  (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) 
MSA resident 0.010 0.009 0.011*** 0.012***  -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
constant                     4.976*** 4.943*** 5.807*** 5.766*** 
      (0.096) (0.096) (0.113) (0.113) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exit Year Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 26,082 26,082 66,535 66,535 Obs 39,823 39,823 41,572 41,572 
chi2 5,967.3 10,546.4 3,792.6 3,873.3 R2 0.285 0.285 0.293 0.293 
Pseudo R2 0.202 0.356 0.067 0.068 Adj R2 0.283 0.284 0.291 0.292 
***, **, and * denote coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. Skill Overshooting - Propensity Score Estimation: (dependent variable: I_SkillOS)   
 
  I II III IV V VI 
Ed: Years of schooling -0.215*** -0.217*** -0.215*** -0.217*** -0.215*** -0.217*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Limited English Proficiency -0.051*** -0.049*** -0.052*** -0.050*** -0.052*** -0.050*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Tenure -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log (Pre-Part Earnings)  0.041***  0.041***  0.042***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Import Penetration:   0.023 0.026   
    All Imports   (0.000) (0.000)   
Import Penetration:      0.099
** 0.111*** 
   Low Income     (0.000) (0.000) 
Age at Participation -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gender: Male -0.136*** -0.145*** -0.136*** -0.145*** -0.136*** -0.145***  
(0.005) -(0.005) -(0.005) -(0.005) -(0.005) -(0.005) 
Eth: Black -0.035*** -0.032*** -0.035*** -0.032*** -0.035*** -0.033***  
(0.007) -(0.007) -(0.007) -(0.007) -(0.007) -(0.007) 
Eth: Hispanic -0.034*** -0.030** -0.034*** -0.031** -0.033** -0.029**  
(0.010) -(0.010) -(0.010) -(0.010) -(0.010) -(0.010) 
Eth: Asian -0.079*** -0.079*** -0.079*** -0.079*** -0.079*** -0.079***  
(0.013) -(0.013) -(0.013) -(0.013) -(0.013) -(0.013) 
Eth: Other -0.031 -0.030 -0.031 -0.030 -0.032 -0.031  
(0.020) -(0.020) -(0.020) -(0.020) -(0.020) -(0.020) 
MSA resident 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.006) -(0.006) -(0.006) -(0.006) -(0.006) -(0.006) 
Industry (2-digit SIC) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Participation Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 50,324 50,324 50,324 50,324 50,324 50,324 
Chi2 17,315.7 17,348.7 17,318.0 17,351.5 17,338.5 17,374.8 
Pseudo R2 0.251 0.251 0.251 0.251 0.251 0.252 
Avg chance of overshooting 0.449 0.446 0.447 0.444 0.447 0.444 
***, **, and * denote coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Summary Statistics: Treated vs. Controls  
  All 
 Matched with one control  Matched with two controls 
  Treated Control Total 
 Treated Control Total  Treated Control Total 
Ed: Years of schooling 12.258 12.309 12.288  12.130 12.133 12.132  12.483 12.463 12.470  
(0.722) (0.743) (0.735) (0.623) (0.592) (0.608) (0.821) (0.824) (0.823) 
Limited English Proficiency 0.032 0.036 0.034  0.035 0.036 0.035  0.027 0.036 0.033 
 (0.176) (0.186) (0.182)  (0.183) (0.186) (0.184)  (0.163) (0.186) (0.179) 
Tenure 10.193 10.235 10.217  9.891 9.824 9.857  10.721 10.595 10.637  
(8.754) (8.809) (8.786) (8.529) (8.612) (8.570) (9.112) (8.964) (9.013) 
log(Pre-Part Earnings) 42.927 43.119 43.038  42.628 42.726 42.677  43.451 43.463 43.459 
 (10.099) (9.750) (9.899)  (10.062) (9.741) (9.902)  (10.143) (9.746) (9.879) 
Age at Participation 8.969 8.976 8.973  8.953 8.962 8.958  8.998 8.988 8.992  
(0.525) (0.523) (0.524) (0.525) (0.518) (0.522) (0.524) (0.527) (0.526) 
Gender: Male 0.470 0.497 0.485  0.438 0.450 0.444  0.525 0.537 0.533  
(0.499) (0.500) (0.500) (0.496) (0.498) (0.497) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499) 
Obs.  6,644 9,060 15,704   4,228 4,228 8,456   2,416 4,832 7,248 
* This table of treated and control come from propensity matching based on specification VI from Table 4 where the dependent 
variable is the indicator on whether the trainee overshoot in the training relative to their education (I_SkillOS). 
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Table 6. Skill Overshooting - Outcomes: All Education Levels  
 
A. All observations 
 
      
  Upgrading Reemployment Wage Replacement 
Post-participation 
Earnings 
I_SkillOS 0.402*** -0.020***  0.018
** 0.017** 0.018* 0.022***  
(0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
log (Pre-Part Earnings)     -0.384
***  0.410
***  
 (0.006) (0.007) 
Constant    1.013
*** 4.290*** 8.455*** 4.934***  
 (0.089) (0.096) (0.089) (0.105) 
Exit Year YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Obs 9,136 24,106 Obs 17,366 17,366 18,120 18,120 
Pseudo R2 0.189 0.008 R2 0.002 0.227 0.014 0.195 
mfx 0.223 0.861 Adj R2 0.001 0.227 0.014 0.195 
B. MSA sample only 
  Upgrading Reemployment   Wage Replacement 
Post-participation 
Earnings 
I_SkillOS 0.505*** -0.032***  0.017 0.020 0.022 0.020  
(0.021) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) 
log (Pre-Part Earnings)     -0.434
***  0.330
***  
 (0.013) (0.015) 
Exit Yr UR 6-9% -0.036 -0.016  0.023 -0.007 -0.022 0.008  
(0.027) (0.011) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) 
Exit Yr UR 9-12% -0.064 -0.021  0.098
*** -0.069** -0.232*** -0.102***  
(0.055) (0.019) (0.024) (0.021) (0.028) (0.026) 
Exit Yr UR 12% higher 0.231 -0.029  0.080 -0.185
*** -0.432*** -0.227***  
(0.225) (0.039) (0.045) (0.041) (0.050) (0.050) 
Constant    0.827
*** 4.647*** 8.506*** 5.601***  
 (0.127) (0.156) (0.149) (0.183) 
Exit Year YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Obs 1,650 5,513 Obs 3,998 3,998 4,185 4,185 
Pseudo R2 0.251 0.020 R2 0.013 0.268 0.044 0.163 
mfx 0.258 0.861 Adj R2 0.01 0.266 0.042 0.161 
***, **, and * denote coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7. Propensity Score Estimation: High School Grad + Equivalent  
 All Geographic Units  MSA Residents Only 
  I II III  I II III 
        
Limited English Proficiency -0.081*** -0.081*** -0.082***  -0.129*** -0.127*** -0.126***  
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)  (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Tenure -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***  -0.002* -0.002* -0.002*  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
log (Pre-Part Earnings) 0.027** 0.027** 0.029***  0.029 0.028 0.030  
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Import Penetration:  0.001    0.068  
   All Imports 
 
(0.021)  (0.049) 
Import Penetration:   0.120
**    0.145 
   Low Income 
 
(0.045)  (0.101) 
Age at Participation -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
-0.002** -0.002** -0.002**  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Gender: Male -0.148*** -0.148*** -0.147***  -0.130*** -0.129*** -0.128***  
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Eth: Black -0.028** -0.028** -0.029**  -0.050* -0.051* -0.050*  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Eth: Hispanic -0.050** -0.050** -0.049**  -0.045 -0.043 -0.043  
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)  (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Eth: Asian -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.086***  -0.115** -0.115** -0.116**  
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)  (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Eth: Other 0.010 0.010 0.010  -0.063 -0.064 -0.062  
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033)  (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
MSA resident -0.003 -0.003 -0.003      
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Participation Year Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 19,156 19,156 19,156  4,582 4,582 4,582 
Pseudo R2 1,640.6 1,640.6 1,647.7  542.6 544.5 544.6 
mfx 0.066 0.066 0.066  0.092 0.092 0.092 
***, **, and * denote coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8. Skill Overshooting - Labor Market Outcomes: High School Graduates & Equivalent 
A. All observations 
 
      
  Upgrading Reemployment  Wage Replacement Rate Post-participation Earnings 
I_SkillOS 0.396*** -0.029***  0.023
** 0.022*** 0.026** 0.029*** 
 (0.011) (0.005) 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
log (Pre-Part Earnings)     -0.401
***  0.396
*** 
     (0.007) 
 
(0.009) 
Constant    0.954
*** 4.415*** 8.452*** 5.037***  
   (0.116) (0.118) (0.117) (0.136) 
Exit Year YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Obs 6,209 17,209 Obs 12,392 12,392 12,915 12,915 
Pseudo R2 0.184 0.006 R2 0.003 0.244 0.013 0.187 
mfx 0.226 0.860 Adj R2 0.002 0.243 0.013 0.187 
B. MSA sample only  
  Upgrading Reemployment  Wage Replacement Rate Post-participation Earnings 
I_SkillOS 0.508*** -0.023**  0.029
* 0.020 0.017 0.025 
 (0.027) (0.011) 
 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.017) (0.016) 
log (Pre-Part Earnings)     -0.426
***  0.353
*** 
     (0.016) 
 
(0.018) 
Exit Yr UR 6-9% -0.067* -0.025*  0.006 -0.023 -0.045
* -0.014 
 (0.034) (0.014) 
 
(0.018) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019) 
Exit Yr UR 9-12% -0.043 -0.051**  0.073
** -0.109*** -0.300*** -0.144*** 
 (0.069) (0.026) 
 
(0.028) (0.026) (0.033) (0.031) 
Exit Yr UR 12% higher  -0.062  0.034 -0.234
*** -0.518*** -0.296*** 
  (0.048) 
 
(0.055) (0.051) (0.062) (0.061) 
Constant    0.849
*** 4.611*** 8.546*** 5.430*** 
    (0.142) (0.181) (0.167) (0.213) 
Exit Year YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Obs 1,078 3,913 Obs 2,858 2,858 2,986 2,986 
Pseudo R2 0.248 0.010 R2 0.011 0.247 0.055 0.181 
mfx 0.277 0.859 Adj R2 0.007 0.244 0.052 0.178 
***, **, and * denote coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9. Wage Overshooting/Upgrading - Summary Statistics 
                 a. TOTAL SAMPLE                 b. BALANCED SAMPLE(iii) 
 Overshoot(i) Upgrade(ii) Overshoot Upgrade 
 Observations 67,005 166,241 50,247 50,247 
Sample Share I (%)     
Below 50% 9.21 19.1 9.45 19.11 
between 50% and 75% 18.92 26.84 19.53 27.31 
between 75% and 100% 21.85 24.35 22.29 24.25 
between 100% and 125% 17.19 14.73 17.1 14.2 
between 125% and 150% 11.4 7.07 11.16 6.9 
over 150% 21.43 7.91 20.47 8.24 
Sample Share II (%)     
Overshooting / upgrading 32.83 14.98 31.64 15.14 
Neither (between 75% and 125%) 39.04 39.08 39.39 38.45 
Undershooting / Downgrading 28.13 45.94 28.98 46.41 
Other Stats     
Mean 1.16 0.87 1.14 0.87 
Std. Dev 0.71 0.50 0.69 0.50 
Min 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.05 
Max 11.81 16.88 11.81 16.88 
i. The overshoot column for the total sample includes participants who enrolled in training programs with a valid occupation code for 
the training occupation reported in TAPR regardless of their reemployment status. 
ii. The upgrade column for the total sample includes participants who are reemployed with a valid occupation code for the 
reemployment occupation reported in TAPR regardless of their training status. 
iii. This is a unified sample of those who enrolled in training with a valid training occupation code then were reemployed with a valid 
reemployment occupation code.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10. Educational Attainment and Wage Overshooting/Upgrading 
 Wage Overshooting Wage Upgrading 
 All observations(i) Balanced Sample(ii) All observations(iii) Balanced Sample 
Degree attainment 
No. of 
Obs. 
Avg. 
Overshoot 
(std dev) 
No. of 
Obs. 
Avg. 
Overshoot  
(std dev) 
  
No. of 
Obs. 
Avg. 
Upgrading 
(std dev) 
No. of 
Obs. 
Avg. 
Upgrading 
(std dev) 
Less than HS 7,220 1.20 (0.60) 4,811 1.17 (0.60) 18,783 0.90 (0.48) 4,811 0.88 (0.44) 
HS grad or eqv 39,571 1.17 (0.71) 29,916 1.14 (0.69) 103,793 0.86 (0.48) 29,916 0.87 (0.48) 
Some College 16,717 1.17 (0.75) 12,952 1.16 (0.75) 34,529 0.87 (0.54) 12,952 0.88 (0.55) 
Bachelor 2,974 1.04 (0.66) 2,198 1.04 (0.65) 7,414 0.86 (0.52) 2,198 0.85 (0.52) 
Grad School 523 1.03 (0.78) 370 1.06 (0.81) 1,722 0.87 (0.54) 370 0.85 (0.59) 
ALL 67,005 1.16 (0.71) 50,247 1.15 (0.70) 166,241 0.87 (0.50) 50,247 0.87 (0.50) 
i. Participants who enrolled in training programs with a valid training occupation code reported in TAPR regardless of their reemployment status. 
ii. Participants who enrolled in training with a valid training occupation code then were reemployed with valid post-participation earnings 
reported.   
iii. Participants who were reemployed with a valid post-participation earnings reported in TAPR regardless of their training status. 
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Table 11.  Wage Overshooting – Propensity Score Estimation 
 
 All Education levels  HS Grad +Equivalent 
 All Observations MSA Only  All Observations MSA Only 
Ed: Years of schooling 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.033*** 0.033***       
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)  
Limited English -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.059*** -0.059***  -0.076
*** -0.076*** -0.069** -0.068**   
(0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.024) (0.024) 
Tenure -0.001* -0.001*   -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
log(Pre-Part Earnings) -0.820*** -0.820*** -0.873*** -0.873***  -0.856
*** -0.855*** -0.826*** -0.825***  
(0.008) (0.008) (0.017) (0.017) (0.010) (0.010) (0.021) (0.021) 
Import Penetration:   0.007  0.059   0.057  0.076 
   Low Income (0.026) (0.067) (0.034) (0.082) 
Age at Participation -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003***  -0.003
*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Male 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.120*** 0.121***  0.146
*** 0.147*** 0.106*** 0.107***  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) 
Eth: Black -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.040** -0.040**   -0.050
*** -0.050*** -0.029 -0.030  
(0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.016) 
Eth: Hispanic -0.015 -0.015 -0.026 -0.025  -0.007 -0.007 -0.027 -0.026  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.022) (0.022) (0.014) (0.014) (0.027) (0.027) 
Eth: Asian -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.090*** -0.090***  -0.035 -0.035 -0.085
** -0.085**   
(0.012) (0.012) (0.024) (0.024) (0.019) (0.019) (0.030) (0.030) 
Eth: Other -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.090* -0.090*    -0.061
** -0.062**  -0.072 -0.071  
(0.016) (0.016) (0.036) (0.036) (0.021) (0.021) (0.048) (0.048) 
MSA resident 0.010 0.010    0.011 0.011    
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
          
State YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
2-digit SIC YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Participation Year YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Obs. 49,643 49,643 11,634 11,634   28,998 28,998 6,782 6,782 
Chi2 24,259.0 24,259.1 6,078.3 6,079.1  14,475.0 14,477.8 3,372.3 3,373.1 
Pseudo R2 0.390 0.390 0.410 0.410  0.397 0.398 0.402 0.402 
Avg chance of overshooting 0.337 0.324 0.350 0.338   0.337 0.325 0.326 0.313 
***, **, and * denote coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 12. Wage Overshooting - Outcomes: All Education Levels  
 
A. All observations 
 
      
  Upgrading Reemployment  Wage Replacement Rate Post-participation Earnings 
I_WageOS 0.063*** -0.022***  0.076*** 0.064*** 0.037*** 0.069*** 
 (0.007) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) 
log (Pre-Part Earnings)     -0.249***  0.649*** 
     (0.011)  (0.012) 
Constant    0.831*** 3.034*** 8.591*** 2.842***  
   (0.020) (0.095) (0.025) (0.111) 
Exit Year YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Obs 12,165 16,342 Obs 12,036 12,036 12,165 12,165 
Pseudo R2 0.011 0.004 R2 0.013 0.06 0.006 0.207 
mfx 0.144 0.860 Adj R2 0.013 0.059 0.005 0.206 
B. MSA sample only 
  Upgrading Reemployment Wage Replacement Rate Post-participation Earnings 
I_WageOS 0.058*** -0.023**  0.093
*** 0.078*** 0.055*** 0.085*** 
 (0.013) (0.011) 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) 
log (Pre-Part Earnings)     -0.307
***  0.576*** 
     (0.023)  (0.026) 
Exit Yr UR 6-9% -0.010 -0.020  -0.013 -0.024 -0.045
* -0.024 
 (0.016) (0.014) 
 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.019) (0.018) 
Exit Yr UR 9-12% -0.005 -0.019  -0.013 -0.093
*** -0.259*** -0.110*** 
 (0.022) (0.021) 
 
(0.025) (0.024) (0.029) (0.027) 
Exit Yr UR 12% higher -0.066* -0.070  -0.041 -0.185
*** -0.492*** -0.222*** 
 (0.038) (0.052) 
 
(0.049) (0.048) (0.058) (0.055) 
Constant    0.802
*** 3.565*** 8.688*** 3.508*** 
    (0.030) (0.206) (0.053) (0.236) 
Exit Year YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Obs 2,861 3,775 Obs 2,832 2,832 2,861 2,861 
Pseudo R2 0.018 0.011 R2 0.024 0.085 0.053 0.198 
mfx 0.127 0.869 Adj R2 0.02 0.082 0.049 0.195 
***, **, and * denote coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 13. Wage Overshooting - Outcomes: High School Graduates & Equivalent 
 
A. All observations 
 
      
 Upgrading Reemployment  Wage Replacement Rate Post-participation Earnings 
I_WageOS 0.067*** -0.033***  0.072*** 0.053*** 0.027** 0.060*** 
 (0.009) (0.007)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
log (Pre-Part Earnings)     -0.331***  0.560*** 
     (0.014)  (0.017) 
Constant    0.832*** 3.769*** 8.615*** 3.646*** 
    (0.022) (0.128) (0.029) (0.154) 
Exit Year YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Obs 6,998 9,362 Obs 6,922 6,922 6,998 6,998 
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.008 R2 0.012 0.083 0.005 0.146 
mfx 0.141 0.865 Adj_R2 0.011 0.082 0.004 0.145 
B. MSA sample only  
  Upgrading Reemployment  Wage Replacement Rate Post-participation Earnings 
I_WageOS 0.048*** -0.029*  0.074*** 0.056** 0.027 0.056**  
(0.017) (0.015)  (0.018) (0.017) (0.021) (0.020) 
log (Pre-Part Earnings)     -0.347***  0.541***  
    (0.027)  (0.032) 
Exit Yr UR 6-9% 0.019 -0.031*  0.000 -0.015 -0.038 -0.013  
(0.019) (0.018)  (0.021) (0.019) (0.023) (0.021) 
Exit Yr UR 9-12% -0.002 -0.072**  0.009 -0.065* -0.169*** -0.053  
(0.031) (0.031)  (0.033) (0.031) (0.037) (0.035) 
Exit Yr UR 12% higher -0.093** -0.098  -0.124* -0.283*** -0.567*** -0.317***  
(0.037) (0.072)  (0.059) (0.062) (0.079) (0.073) 
Constant    0.782*** 3.900*** 8.674*** 3.814***  
   (0.041) (0.247) (0.062) (0.292) 
Exit Year YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Obs 1,664 2,178 Obs 1,649 1,649 1,664 1,664 
Pseudo R2 0.016 0.014 R2  0.016 0.093 0.033 0.165 
mfx 0.125 0.878 Adj R2 0.01 0.087 0.027 0.16 
***, **, and * denote coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A1. Summary Statistics of Average Education level of each occupation – IPUMS CPS 
Percentile 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 TAPR 
1% 10.96 10.90 10.90 10.89 10.95 10.97 11.02 11.09 8 
5% 11.33 11.30 11.36 11.37 11.37 11.43 11.49 11.47 9 
10% 11.58 11.61 11.59 11.64 11.65 11.74 11.72 11.76 11 
25% 12.10 12.13 12.12 12.10 12.13 12.20 12.17 12.22 12 
50% 12.91 12.93 12.91 12.93 12.98 13.01 13.01 13.05 12 
75% 14.36 14.37 14.33 14.36 14.36 14.39 14.42 14.48 13 
90% 15.61 15.67 15.62 15.66 15.69 15.60 15.75 15.70 14 
95% 16.24 16.22 16.17 16.22 16.21 16.10 16.25 16.24 16 
99% 16.95 16.97 16.97 16.98 16.98 16.82 16.96 16.91 17 
  Obs 478 478 470 470 470 470 470 466 233,687 
  Mean 13.30 13.32 13.30 13.31 13.33 13.36 13.39 13.42 12.29 
  Std. Dev. 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.47 1.50 1.49 1.57 
  Min 10.35 10.5 10.41 10.37 10.26 10.51 10.24 10.4 7 
  Max  17 17 16.99 16.99 17 16.84 16.99 16.98 17 
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Table A2. Skill Overshooting - Outcomes: All Education Levels  
 
A. All observations        
  Upgrading Reemployment Wage Replacement 
Post-participation 
Earnings 
I_SkillOS 0.402*** -0.02***  0.018
** 0.017** 0.018* 0.022***  
(0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
log (Pre-Part Earnings)     -0.384
***  0.410
***  
    
(0.006) (0.007) 
Constant    1.013
*** 4.290*** 8.455*** 4.934***  
 
 
(0.089) (0.096) (0.089) (0.105) 
Exit Year YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Obs 9,136 24,106 Obs 17,366 17,366 18,120 18,120 
Pseudo R2 0.189 0.008 R2 0.002 0.227 0.014 0.195 
mfx 0.223 0.861 Adj R2 0.001 0.227 0.014 0.195 
B. MSA sample only 
  Upgrading Reemployment   Wage Replacement 
Post-participation 
Earnings 
I_SkillOS 0.505*** -0.032***  0.017 0.020 0.022 0.020 
 
(0.021) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) 
log (Pre-Part Earnings)     -0.434
***  0.330
*** 
 
 (0.013) (0.015) 
Exit Yr UR 6-9% -0.036 -0.016  0.023 -0.007 -0.022 0.008 
 
(0.027) (0.011) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) 
Exit Yr UR 9-12% -0.064 -0.021  0.098
*** -0.069** -0.232*** -0.102*** 
 
(0.055) (0.019) (0.024) (0.021) (0.028) (0.026) 
Exit Yr UR 12% higher 0.231 -0.029  0.080 -0.185
*** -0.432*** -0.227*** 
 
(0.225) (0.039) (0.045) (0.041) (0.050) (0.050) 
Constant    0.827
*** 4.647*** 8.506*** 5.601*** 
 
 (0.127) (0.156) (0.149) (0.183) 
Exit Year YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Obs 1,650 5,513 Obs 3,998 3,998 4,185 4,185 
Pseudo R2 0.251 0.020 R2 0.013 0.268 0.044 0.163 
mfx 0.258 0.861 Adj R2 0.01 0.266 0.042 0.161 
***, **, and * denote coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table A3. Skill Overshooting - Outcomes: High School Graduates & Equivalent 
A. All observations  
      
  Upgrading Reemployment  Wage Replacement Rate Post-participation Earnings 
I_SkillOS 0.396*** -0.029***  0.023
** 0.022*** 0.026** 0.029***  
(0.011) (0.005) 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
log (Pre-Part Earnings)     -0.401
***  0.396
***  
 
   
(0.007) 
 
(0.009) 
Constant    0.954
*** 4.415*** 8.452*** 5.037***  
 
  
(0.116) (0.118) (0.117) (0.136) 
Exit Year YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Obs 6,209 17,209 Obs 12,392 12,392 12,915 12,915 
Pseudo R2 0.184 0.006 R2 0.003 0.244 0.013 0.187 
mfx 0.226 0.860 Adj R2 0.002 0.243 0.013 0.187 
B. MSA sample only  
  Upgrading Reemployment  Wage Replacement Rate Post-participation Earnings 
I_SkillOS 0.508*** -0.023**  0.029
* 0.020 0.017 0.025  
(0.027) (0.011) 
 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.017) (0.016) 
log (Pre-Part Earnings)     -0.426
***  0.353
***  
 
   
(0.016) 
 
(0.018) 
Exit Yr UR 6-9% -0.067* -0.025*  0.006 -0.023 -0.045
* -0.014  
(0.034) (0.014) 
 
(0.018) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019) 
Exit Yr UR 9-12% -0.043 -0.051**  0.073
** -0.109*** -0.300*** -0.144***  
(0.069) (0.026) 
 
(0.028) (0.026) (0.033) (0.031) 
Exit Yr UR 12% higher  -0.062  0.034 -0.234
*** -0.518*** -0.296***  
 (0.048) 
 
(0.055) (0.051) (0.062) (0.061) 
Constant    0.849
*** 4.611*** 8.546*** 5.430***  
 
  
(0.142) (0.181) (0.167) (0.213) 
Exit Year YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Obs 1,078 3,913 Obs 2,858 2,858 2,986 2,986 
Pseudo R2 0.248 0.010 R2 0.011 0.247 0.055 0.181 
mfx 0.277 0.859 Adj R2 0.007 0.244 0.052 0.178 
***, **, and * denote coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table A4. Wage Overshooting - Outcomes: All Education Levels  
 
A. All observations  
      
  Upgrading Reemployment  Wage Replacement Rate Post-participation Earnings 
I_WageOS 0.063*** -0.022***  0.076*** 0.064*** 0.037*** 0.069***  
(0.007) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) 
log (Pre-Part Earnings)     -0.249***  0.649***  
    (0.011)  (0.012) 
Constant    0.831*** 3.034*** 8.591*** 2.842***  
   (0.020) (0.095) (0.025) (0.111) 
Exit Year YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Obs 12,165 16,342 Obs 12,036 12,036 12,165 12,165 
Pseudo R2 0.011 0.004 R2 0.013 0.06 0.006 0.207 
mfx 0.144 0.860 Adj R2 0.013 0.059 0.005 0.206 
B. MSA sample only 
  Upgrading Reemployment Wage Replacement Rate Post-participation Earnings 
I_WageOS 0.058*** -0.023**  0.093
*** 0.078*** 0.055*** 0.085***  
(0.013) (0.011) 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) 
log (Pre-Part Earnings)     -0.307
***  0.576***  
  
 
 (0.023)  (0.026) 
Exit Yr UR 6-9% -0.010 -0.020  -0.013 -0.024 -0.045
* -0.024  
(0.016) (0.014) 
 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.019) (0.018) 
Exit Yr UR 9-12% -0.005 -0.019  -0.013 -0.093
*** -0.259*** -0.110***  
(0.022) (0.021) 
 
(0.025) (0.024) (0.029) (0.027) 
Exit Yr UR 12% higher -0.066* -0.070  -0.041 -0.185
*** -0.492*** -0.222***  
(0.038) (0.052) 
 
(0.049) (0.048) (0.058) (0.055) 
Constant    0.802
*** 3.565*** 8.688*** 3.508***  
 
  
(0.030) (0.206) (0.053) (0.236) 
Exit Year YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Obs 2,861 3,775 Obs 2,832 2,832 2,861 2,861 
Pseudo R2 0.018 0.011 R2 0.024 0.085 0.053 0.198 
mfx 0.127 0.869 Adj R2 0.02 0.082 0.049 0.195 
***, **, and * denote coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table A5. Wage Overshooting - Outcomes: High School Graduates & Equivalent 
 
A. All observations  
      
  Upgrading Reemployment  Wage Replacement Rate Post-participation Earnings 
I_WageOS 0.067*** -0.033***  0.072*** 0.053*** 0.027** 0.060***  
(0.009) (0.007)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
log (Pre-Part Earnings)     -0.331***  0.560***  
    (0.014)  (0.017) 
Constant    0.832*** 3.769*** 8.615*** 3.646***  
   (0.022) (0.128) (0.029) (0.154) 
Exit Year YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Obs 6,998 9,362 Obs 6,922 6,922 6,998 6,998 
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.008 R2 0.012 0.083 0.005 0.146 
mfx 0.141 0.865 Adj_R2 0.011 0.082 0.004 0.145 
B. MSA sample only  
  Upgrading Reemployment  Wage Replacement Rate Post-participation Earnings 
I_WageOS 0.048*** -0.029*  0.074*** 0.056** 0.027 0.056**  
(0.017) (0.015)  (0.018) (0.017) (0.021) (0.020) 
log (Pre-Part Earnings)     -0.347***  0.541***  
    (0.027)  (0.032) 
Exit Yr UR 6-9% 0.019 -0.031*  0.000 -0.015 -0.038 -0.013  
(0.019) (0.018)  (0.021) (0.019) (0.023) (0.021) 
Exit Yr UR 9-12% -0.002 -0.072**  0.009 -0.065* -0.169*** -0.053  
(0.031) (0.031)  (0.033) (0.031) (0.037) (0.035) 
Exit Yr UR 12% higher -0.093** -0.098  -0.124* -0.283*** -0.567*** -0.317***  
(0.037) (0.072)  (0.059) (0.062) (0.079) (0.073) 
Constant    0.782*** 3.900*** 8.674*** 3.814***  
   (0.041) (0.247) (0.062) (0.292) 
Exit Year YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Obs 1,664 2,178 Obs 1,649 1,649 1,664 1,664 
Pseudo R2 0.016 0.014 R2  0.016 0.093 0.033 0.165 
mfx 0.125 0.878 Adj R2 0.01 0.087 0.027 0.16 
***, **, and * denote coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table A6. Skill Overshooting v. Skill Upgrading 
  Overshooting in years   
Upgrading in years 
-4 or 
less -4 &-3 -3 &-2 -2 &-1 -1 &0 0 &1 1 &2 2 &3 3 &4 
4 or 
more Total % 
less than -4 73.2 6.0 1.8 0.2 0 0.0 0 0 0 0 0.2 
between -4 and -3 12.5 71.9 12.5 3.1 1.2 0.2 0 0 0 0 1.3 
between -3 and -2 5.4 10.2 68.0 7.5 4.1 0.7 0.2 0.1 0 0 2.8 
between -2 and -1 3.6 4.9 9.4 69.5 12.0 2.9 1.8 1.8 0.5 0 6.9 
between -1 and 0 3.6 4.9 5.1 13.4 67.7 9.8 7.8 7.4 4.0 2.7 15.3 
between 0 and 1 1.8 2.1 2.2 4.1 10.9 75.5 23.2 21.7 18.9 11.6 33.5 
between 1 and 2 0 0 1.0 1.1 3.1 7.9 59.9 19.2 19.2 7.2 23.6 
between 2 and 3 0 0 0 0.7 0.8 1.8 3.9 42.7 9.1 6.0 7.3 
between 3 and 4 0 0 0 0.4 0.3 0.7 2.0 5.5 45.1 13.3 5.4 
4 or more 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.5 0.9 1.6 3.2 59.2 3.6 
Total Observations 56 285 721 1,620 3,748 8,553 8,843 3,279 2,285 1,422 30,812 
i. This table is tabulated using only the participants who received occupational skills training,   were reemployed, and have valid occupations 
codes for both training and reemployment (the balanced sample in Table 1). 
ii. The figures show the share of each year of upgrading as a share of the category of overshooting listed on top. Each column sums up to 100%.  
 
 
Table A7. Wage Overshooting v. Wage Upgrading 
  Wage Overshooting   
Wage upgrading Below 50% 50-75% 75-100% 100-125% 125-150% over 150% Total 
Below 50% 61.2 30.8 16.2 11.1 7.1 5.0 19.1 
50-75% 22.0 37.0 34.0 26.6 22.2 16.6 27.3 
75-100% 11.3 20.2 28.5 30.4 27.8 22.4 24.3 
100-125% 4.1 7.7 13.1 17.8 21.9 19.0 14.2 
125-150% 0.9 2.7 4.7 7.9 10.9 13.0 6.9 
over 150% 0.5 1.6 3.5 6.2 10.2 23.9 8.2 
Total 4,747 9,814 11,200 8,590 5,610 10,286 50,247 
* This table is tabulated using only the participants who received occupational skills training, were reemployed, and have valid 
occupations codes for both training and reemployment. 
 
 
 
